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DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA
Bush administration has broadened the meaning of 'Preemption' to include 'Preventive War,'
where force may be used, even without evidence of an imminent attack, to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not gather or grow over time. The strategy also elevates preemption in importance and visibility within the tool kit of U.S. foreign policy, in order to dissuade others from contemplating attacks on the United States.
In adopting such a strategy, President Bush has struck a death blow against Article 51 of the UN Charter, rejecting the traditional requirement of imminent threat, instead declaring the intent of the United States to act preemptively:
The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction -and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. 3 This doctrine of unilateral pre-emption is a radical departure from the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter provided the most powerful states with permanent membership on the Security Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the common good and promote and obey international law. As
Harry Truman, then-President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, "we all have to recognize -no matter how great our strength -that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please." 4 The Bush administration's declared willingness to attack potential enemies, prior to an actual imminent threat, represents a new chapter in strategic doctrine that heightens the danger of unintended consequences and raises many questions with regard to its implications. By adopting preemption as a doctrine, the United States has set a precedent that will encourage other states to legitimize their own aggression under the guise of preemptive defensive measures. Various states may have already begun to do this, lowering the threshold for armed conflict, thus making the world less stable. A few examples in this regard could be:
• India against Pakistan.
• Israel against the Palestinians or other Arab countries.
• Russia against the Chechens.
• China against Taiwan.
• North Korea against South Korea.
The doctrine of unilateral military preemption undermines the strengthening of international cooperation, non-proliferation and disarmament, and especially international law and institutions. It reflects the Bush administration's penchant for unilateralism. Preemption sounds better in theory than it is likely to be in practice. It is not the solution to the problem of terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In practice, it will not work and, in principle, it breaks all existing rules. Rather, preemption only diminishes the role of diplomatic cooperation and non-proliferation regimes, weakening their effectiveness against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Moreover, it is a risky option that can backfire. Politically, a government needs a legal basis and moral grounds to support pre-emptive attacks; technically, it needs reliable intelligence about the rival's capabilities and intent as well as assurances that attack on the targets will be accurate. Otherwise, the consequence of violating other countries' sovereignty and hurting innocent people will be significant.
PREEMPTIVE VS PREVENTIVE MILITARY ACTION
The concepts of preemptive and preventive warfare refer to different phenomena. A preemptive military attack entails the use of force to quell or mitigate an impending strike by an adversary. On the other hand, a preventive military attack involves the use of force to eliminate any possible future strike, even if there is little or no reason to believe that aggression is planned or the capability to launch such an attack is operational. The grounds for preemption lie in evidence of a credible and imminent threat, whereas the basis for prevention rests on the suspicion of an incipient and contingent threat. Traditionally, the right of self-defense has been understood as, "allowing states recourse to force when repelling actual as well as imminent armed attacks." 5 Self-defense is perhaps the oldest rationale given by states to justify their use of force.
Although international law recognizes a right to defend oneself against aggression, however, it is highly debatable when that right may be invoked. While military preemption is justifiable whenever an attack is truly imminent, a doctrine which approves of preventive warfare will ultimately undermine international peace and stability.
Preventive strikes, couched in the idiom of preemption, do not always yield long-term benefits;
hence, prevention is a far less accepted concept in international law. Moreover, the defensive reaction must be proportionate to the danger, and cannot serve as a reprisal. Self-defense is thus restricted to protection, not excessive or punitive military measures aimed at redressing injuries. Therefore, the decision of the Bush administration to take preventive military action against Iraq, under the guise of preemption, has undermined the role of diplomatic cooperation and non-proliferation regimes, weakening their effectiveness against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.
Another problem is that the strategy fails to distinguish between eliminating dangerous capabilities and overthrowing dangerous regimes. Even the unilateral use of force to eliminate WMD is controversial, as can be seen from the broad international condemnation of Israel's attack on Iraqi's Osirak Nuclear Reactor in 1981. Pursuing regime change has broad consequences for the overall stability of the international system and is thus even less accepted as a legitimate objective than eliminating WMD. A preventive regime change strategy may trigger the very use of WMD that the strategy seeks to preclude.
PREEMPTIVE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The temptation to attack an adversary who may attack you sometime in the future is often quite powerful. As Cardinal Richelieu once advised King Louis XIII of France:
Nothing is more valuable in statecraft than foresight. Just as a doctor who knows how to prevent illness is more esteemed than the one who works cures …it is more important to anticipate the future than to dwell upon the present, since with enemies of the state, as with diseases, it is better to advance to attack than to wait and drive them out after they have invaded.
Hence, according to Cardinal Richelieu, vigilance is crucial, since it allows national leaders to prevent security problems that can only be remedied with great difficulty afterwards.
However, it is important to understand the legal implications of exercising the option of preemption on the justification of exercising vigilance.
Although preventive military action may seem expedient, a significant body of scholars wrestles with the question of whether it is legally permissible. The general consensus holds that while preemptive action is warranted when facing what former U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt once called 'a rattlesnake poised to strike', attempts to justify preventive wars are a bottomless pit of elastic normative principles. 9 For example, the so-called 'father' of international law, Hugo Grotius, insisted that preemption was only lawful when a danger became 'immediate, and, as it were, at the point of happening.' 10 He considered taking up arms in order to weaken a state that might someday use violence against you as '"repugnant to every principle of justice." 11 Likewise, another pioneer of modern international jurisprudence, Emmerich de Vattel, counseled that acting merely on vague suspicions risks transforming the initiator of preventive war into an aggressor.
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The NSS makes the point that international law recognizes preemption in case of an imminent danger of attack, but also conditions its legitimacy on the degree of imminence. It adds to this point that the concept of imminent threat has to be adapted to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. In this regard the NSS states that, "Rogue states and terrorists…rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destructionweapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning…To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." 13 International lawyers accept the first part of the argument but reject the second. Schrijver, for example, concurs that the right to preemptive self-defense is recognized in international law and is also in agreement with the UN Charter but notes that it is limited to acute danger or direct threat, also in the case of terrorist violence. A victim state cannot invoke the right to self-defense in order to justify its attacking another state that, in its opinion, is a supporter or potential supporter of terrorists. 14 Hendrickson makes a similar point, from the perspective of international relations. He writes:
Though styled as a doctrine of preemption, it is actually a doctrine of preventive war. Preemptive war is when force is used only when it is apparent that the enemy is on the verge of striking, leaving no moment for deliberation. Preventive war is the first use of force to avert a more remote though still ostensibly formidable danger…War, the advocates of prevention say, is inevitable anyway, so let's fight it under circumstances of our own choosing. In the present case, we are told that once Iraq or other evil states develop the capability to hit us, they will hit us. Ergo, we must strike to avert the threatened calamity, and sooner rather than later…..That may not seem like much of a difference, but it is the difference in law between offensive and defensive war, and between aggression and selfdefense. It is directly contrary to the principle that so often was the rallying cry of American internationalism in the twentieth century. 15 The NSS does not give even passing reference to the Charter of United Nations, (i.e. Adoption of this doctrine has been met with concern not only within the United States but also abroad-and not without reason. The doctrine suffers from considerable conceptual confusion, most importantly by conflating the notion of prevention with that of preemption.
Whatever the merits and demerits of a preemption doctrine, there are practical problems with relying on such a policy for dealing with the current threat in all but the most extreme situations.
One is the difficulty of determining the timing of any preemptive strike, especially if the goal is to preempt the acquisition of WMD. Is construction of a nuclear plant sufficient reason (as Israel believed to be the case in 1981 when it attacked the Osirak reactor) to attack? Can an attack on a pharmaceutical or fertilizer factory (as was the case in 1988, when the U.S. struck a facility in Sudan) be justified? These are some of the issues which require serious consideration by the United States.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
The The doctrine of preemption is strategically imprudent. If taken seriously by others, it will exacerbate the security dilemma among hostile states, by raising the incentive for all states to initiate military action before others do. Take the very real case of India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers with long-standing territorial disputes and other grievances. Suppose tensions rise, as they did during 2001 when a million Indian and Pakistani troops massed on the border, Islamabad, fearing that New Delhi might try to preempt its quite vulnerable nuclear strike capability, will have a powerful incentive to preempt. India, knowing this to be the case, will have an equally powerful incentive to get its weapons off before Pakistan does. A similar situation may develop in the Korean Peninsula, or with Israel. Given this dynamic, the use of force in tense situations like these will increasingly be viewed as a first resort, thus undermining whatever moderating influence diplomatic intervention might otherwise have had. The Bush administration, while arrogating to itself the right to use force whenever and wherever it believes the preemption of potential future threats warrant it, has made no effort to define the line separating justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression. And that may well be the gravest flaw with this doctrine.
RAMIFICATIONS WITHIN THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION
The United States' post-September 11 campaign against terrorism has provided India with an ideal opportunity to exploit the situation and pursue its hegemonic designs by intensifying its efforts to emerge as the regional and a global power. In South Asia, India has always considered Pakistan as its adversary and has made repeated efforts to establish its strategic superiority. After the May 1998 nuclear explosions, the Bharatia Janata Party's (BJP) The terrorist attacks of September 11 and subsequent campaign by the United States against terrorism provided another opportunity to India to pursue its goals of regional hegemony and international power status. India was pleased that America was treating the attacks as a declaration of war by the terrorist groups, thus heralding a new era in which India hoped, it would be able to join the US and Israel in their fight against terrorism inspired by Islamic fundamentalism. 24 Since 9/11, in relation to the movement in Occupied Kashmir, the BJP Government no longer used the term 'infiltration' or 'insurgency,' but 'cross-border terrorism.'
The fall-out of the preemption doctrine adopted by the United States was predictable.
India seized upon it to declare that New Delhi had a better justification to launch preemptive strikes to defend itself against cross-border terrorism from Pakistan than Washington vis-à-vis
Iraq. 25 proposed an anti-terror alliance between India, US, and Israel that "would have the political will and moral authority to take bold decisions in extreme cases of terrorist provocation." 27 In the complex situation of South Asia, the Bush administration's NSS fails to address the second-order effects of the U.S. policy. It has exacerbated regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. The festering hostility between India and Pakistan remains the greatest single threat to regional stability. 28 The fears of Pakistan that such a doctrine could be used by India in a unilateral way to justify an invasion (based on highly debatable assessments), have its roots in the Bush administration's action against Iraq. India asserts that every country has the right to Articulated in the broad and generalized fashion as it has been, the doctrine is a recipe for chaos as it suggests that any state, irrespective of the quality of its decision-making processes, can take it upon itself to act when it perceives a threat, whether that threat is real, looming, or not. In this context it is interesting to note that a self-created perception of always being under threat is deeply rooted in the Indian psyche and there are hotheads who believe that doctrine pronounced by Washington can be adopted by New Delhi also. Thus, one has heard Jaswant Singh, the former Indian Foreign Minister, declare in Washington that, "every country has a right to preemptive strikes as an inherent part of its right to self-defense and it was not the prerogative of any one nation." 30 Given this dynamic, the use of force in tense situations might come to be considered the preferred option, thus undermining whatever moderating influence diplomatic intervention might otherwise have had.
Potential The problem is that, in the wake of the U.S. war on terrorism, India felt that it could follow the U.S. example and deal with its problems related to Kashmir through a military solution. This assumption was premised on the growing international disenchantment with the issue of selfdetermination. This has been a major concern for Pakistan after 9/11. At the heart of antagonism between Pakistan and India lies the Kashmir dispute. Both countries have gone to war three times in the past on this issue. Even at present, the strategy being followed does not display a positive Indian intent aimed at a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue. Given the attitude of the world community and cold shoulder being granted to it by the UN, the possibility of yet another limited or an all-out war in the region cannot be ruled out. Unless the UN honors its obligations towards implementation of its Resolutions on Kashmir, passed 56 years ago, the war clouds will keep looming over the region. Promulgation of a 'Doctrine of Preemption' encompassing preventive war by the U.S. definitely adds fuel to an already volatile situation in South Asia between the two arch rivals possessing nuclear capability.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Combating international terrorism and proliferation of WMD were the main concerns that led to the adoption of a 'Doctrine of Preemption' by the United States. Since these are global problems, only the global community as a whole can effectively act to resolve them. No state, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today's threats. 32 Achieving that solution is only possible by redefining cooperative security and bolstering the existing international arms control regimes -not writing them off. In this regard, some relevant recommendations are offered below:
• At the outset, it is essential to address the root causes of WMD proliferation, meaning that incentive to acquire, distribute, and use WMD by state or non-state actors must be eliminated.
• To effectively reduce the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism, a sincere approach towards redefining cooperative security is needed -to feature mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality, and cooperation -so that it yields greater benefits for all nations.
• Efforts should be redoubled to resolve a number of long-standing disputes which continue to fester and to feed the new threats that we face today. Foremost among these are the issues of Palestine, Kashmir, and the Korean Peninsula.
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• As the world's sole superpower, the United States plays the leading role in maintaining world peace and order and has the capability to solve numerous global issues, including international terrorism and proliferation of WMD. Only through peaceful negotiations, by involving other key players as well, and return to a low tension political atmosphere can these issues be effectively addressed.
• The international community cannot afford to lose confidence in international nonproliferation regimes, treaties, and agreements because of failures to enforce these regimes. The United States should take the lead in setting a good example in supporting these efforts and abiding by international arms control and non-proliferation treaties instead of using them as justification for preemptive strikes.
• Governments cannot choose to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but neglect nuclear disarmament and the Comprehensive Test Bann Treaty (CTBT)
regimes. The fact that the Bush administration continues to delay ratification of the CTBT provides greater reason for currently non-nuclear states to seek WMD.
• Proliferation of WMD and combating international terrorism are global problems and one of the greatest dangers that all nations will face in the twenty first century. The U.S. cannot solve these problems on its own, especially by employing threats of preemptive strikes. International cooperation, particularly among the five permanent members of the Security Council, is essential for dealing effectively with this issue.
• Throughout modern history, the United States has been the leader of the free world. It must adhere to the rules it seeks to impose on others. Much of the world community views the use of the preemption option as of dubious legal standing in all but the clearest circumstances. The U.S. government, therefore, needs to take a fresh look at its policy.
• The global war on terrorism is a long-term endeavor that is not going to be won by military might alone. To win this war will take a sustained effort requiring cooperation of the world community and a strong economical and informational campaign to win the hearts and minds of succeeding generations. Adopting a 'Doctrine of Preemption'
to fight this menace cripples these efforts, encourages an unsustainable military campaign, and provides no worthwhile result in return.
CONCLUSION
Preemption reflects the Bush administration's perception of a changed threat facing the United States and is an extension of the U.S. Government's unilateral foreign policy. This strategy progresses entirely from the security interests of the United States alone. It implies that, with the end of the Cold War, because the United States possesses unprecedented -and unequalled -strength and influence in the world, 34 the U.S. Government is now entitled to do whatever it sees fit in pursuit of its own national interests. Consequently, this policy of "might makes right" is setting the wrong precedent for others to follow, thus seriously jeopardizing the international peace and order. The United States appears to be seeking to establish a new international order, guided only by U.S. interests and values.
The United States' security doctrine threatens global and regional stability through its emphasis on pre-emptive interventionism. The most threatening feature of the doctrine is the arbitrariness which the United States is permitting itself for military interventions. This doctrine will undermine international arms control and disarmament agendas as well as international norms relating to inter-state behavior and the principles governing the use of military force. The post 9/11 world has already become more unstable and violent where every nation feels less secure. So far the United States' war on terror has only served to aggravate the problem of terrorism and violence. The preemptive security doctrine threatens to accentuate these problems even further-thereby creating further instabilities and polarizations.
The Bush administration's strategy thus raises anew timeless moral and legal issues about the conditions under which, and the purposes for which, anticipatory self-defense is permissible to counter potential threats to national and international security. What are the obligations of the powerful? How should they behave in asymmetrical conflicts? Does strategic necessity absolve them from observing the UN Charter regime's limitations on the use of force?
Do unconventional security threats excuse behavior that would otherwise be morally repugnant?
Instead of working alone, the United States should instead work with other powers cooperatively to address the threat of global terrorism and proliferation of WMD, heightened in everyone's eyes after the tragic attacks of September 11.
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